Here is Northumbria UCU's response to University Management's proposal for pay and pensions.

UCU Response to University management

‘Proposal for negotiation – 15 January 2026’

This proposal is unacceptable, treats colleagues with utter contempt, intensifies inequalities, and deprives colleagues of dignity in work and after it.  It is shameful and shocking it is even on the table or considered viable.  It will not achieve its objectives. Moreover, this proposal amplifies strategic risks university management themselves identified and Governors should be monitoring in Financial Reports since 2022 and 2023 (“SR1: Staff are not motivated, engaged, or aligned with the University’s ambitions”; “SR16: The University does not deliver change or large strategic projects effectively”), and will worsen not mitigate the ongoing gender pay gap (13.9%). UCU members do not and will never accept the idea of a Total Reward Approach, nor any detriments for colleagues who stay in TPS, nor leaving national bargaining (nor the mistaken premise that national bargaining is solely about pay). The timescale proposed for people to make decisions is not practical or fair – financial advisors are already informing colleagues they cannot offer advice until negotiations are concluded (and, indeed, that people should consult an actuary instead). The formal response to UCU’s FOI request stated "We can confirm that whilst impact on staff retention and morale has been considered, we did not undertake any formal risk assessment". Why not?  The FOI response also said:  "No business case has been developed to show how any savings made will be allocated."  What is the pay cut or pension shift for, then?   The failure to challenge or vote on this proposal at the Board of Governors in an inclusive way (with staff governors being elected, not just selected) represents a failure of governance at the highest levels.

UCU are concerned that, because we were not consulted sooner, the proposal has resulted in a dispute that, unlike any other we can recall, potentially has no end point if it (or any variation that require a frozen or reduced pay uplift for one group of staff) is implemented. It is usual in a dispute either to reach an agreed outcome, or, even where no solution satisfactory to one side is achieved, there is a change to the situation that renders the dispute concluded (for example, by the implementation of a change to the status quo). However, this is not the case here, if, for example, those staff who are unable to transfer from TPS to USS (because the economic loss would be too great) remain on the same salary with no pay uplifts for an indefinite number of years. This would give rise to a scenario where, in August each year, this one group of staff, who had worked equally hard and achieved the same level of outcomes, would be working alongside other academic and PSS colleagues who were receiving an increase to their salary. In addition to the inevitable resentment and undermining of goodwill that this would give rise to, UCU would be required by its members who were not receiving the annual salary increase to declare a dispute and potentially proceed with industrial action. In such circumstances, Northumbria University would rapidly gain a reputation as an institution in which there was serious disruption each academic year with obvious implications for its standing, and staff and student recruitment.

Note: There is an inaccuracy in the proposal: the contribution tiers are wrong in the 3^rd column for new starters – the 8.9% band will go down to scale point 7.3 and the 9.9% band will go down to scale point 8.1.  These bands are due to change in April and so could be incorrect in all columns – since the proposal refers to later this year.

• Management have not made any commitment that any changes will necessarily be agreed with UCU following a process of negotiation. In other words, there is no commitment changes will not simply be imposed if agreement is not reached (as with changes to sick pay and workloads in the NLC).  This is unacceptable, and bad faith negotiating.
• “Making this commitment now will necessarily result in the University being only able to follow rather than participate fully in national collective pay bargaining (which determines the pay uplift only and no other matters) for academic staff salaries for 2026/27, however the University remains committed to offering competitive salaries and we aim to resume as soon as possible our previous position of participating fully in the national process.” This is unacceptable, a breach of our contract, and of the 2006 Framework Agreement. The proposal notes the university will “follow rather than participate fully in national collective pay bargaining” but states the aim is “to resume as soon as possible.” This suggests awareness that the current position is abnormal and temporary – yet no commitment or timeline is provided. What are the criteria for re-entering collective bargaining? What about all other aspects of working life covered by it? Wouldn’t all other conditions have to stay the same for us to be let back in? Moreover, our contract states that ‘[y]ou will be entitled to receive increments within the scale to the maximum of the grade’ (paragraph 26, emphasis added). However, the current proposal enables progression only up to that level of the scale in which the maximum is offset against the actual salary plus the additional cost of the employer’s contribution to TPS. Furthermore, paragraph 64 of the contract states that ‘[a]greements reached as a result of national or local negotiations between the University and the recognised trade unions shall, after acceptance by the Board of Governors, be automatically incorporated into your contract’. This includes the Pay Modernisation Framework (PMF) signed by the University VC in January 2006 which states in the Implementation Agreement (bullet point 9) that the University will: ‘respect future national collective bargaining agreements, in particular by Increasing the University pay spine in line with agreed increases in the national pay spine. Adjusting the University pay spine to take account of any revisions to the national pay spine.’ The Reward Strategy section of the Agreement also states that for staff on salary grades 1 - 8 ‘[t]he salary structure for staff will be derived from a single salary spine divided into an 8 grade salary scale’ (2.2.3 bullet point (a)). The Reward Strategy section of the PMF Agreement also states that ‘University staff will therefore receive equal pay for the same or broadly similar work and for work rated as equivalent’ (2.3.1 Equal Pay, bullet point (b)). In this context, ‘rated as equivalent’ relates to the outcomes of the HERA role evaluation which was utilised in order to place all Northumbria University staff on the appropriate single salary grade. However, the current proposal creates four groups of staff, all undertaking work established to be of equivalent value, with different total remuneration packages. Academic staff in TPS (group 1) will receive a lower salary than those in USS (group 2). Insofar as the proposal offers any indication of a justification for differential pay in these circumstances, it appears to revolve around the notion of a ‘Total Reward Envelope’ (TRE) in which salary plus employer’s pension contribution are calculated together. This leaves a third group of academic staff who are in no pension scheme (group 3) who receive the same gross salary as group 2, but have a far lower TRE than either group 1 or 2. A fourth group (group 4) is constituted by PSS on the same grades who also receive an identical gross salary to group 2 and 3, which is in excess of that paid to group 1, but whose TRE exceeds the TRE of groups 1, 2 and 3, as the employer’s contribution to LGPS exceeds that encountered as a consequence of having staff in USS. In addition to exposing the University to potential equal pay claims under appropriate legislation, this situation both breaches the commitment to equal pay in the PMF Agreement, and is fundamentally unfair.
• “No pay awards will be applied to the TPS salary scale until the point the total reward envelope equalises.” This is unacceptable. Moreover, the proposal provides no timeline, criteria, or mechanism for when or how this equalisation will occur. No targets in terms of money or people are given about what is viable or acceptable for transition. If the university cannot provide these details, it should acknowledge that the timeline is genuinely indefinite and colleagues in TPS should plan accordingly – though this fundamentally undermines the claim that this is a “fair” transition. This is a critical information gap. Colleagues are being asked to make career-defining pension decisions without knowing:
  • How long the pay cut/freeze will last (1 year? 7 years? 10+ years?)
  • What triggers equalisation (inflation rates; USS rate changes; USS membership thresholds)?
  • How equalisation will be implemented (one-off adjustment? phased increases)?
  • What happens if external factors (e.g., USS employer contribution rates) change?
  • Whether there are guarantees that equalisation will actually occur.

Furthermore, providing a timeline is essential to ensure:

• Informed decision-making: The engagement process repeatedly emphasised colleagues' need for “greater clarity and detailed information to support informed decision-making”. Yet the most fundamental question, “how long will my pay be frozen?”, remains unanswered.
• Financial planning: Colleagues need to model different scenarios for major financial commitments (mortgages, education expenses, retirement planning). Without a timeline, this is impossible.
• Trust and transparency: The university's stated commitment to “focus on clarity, fairness, and transitional support” is undermined when such a critical element remains unspecified.
• Equality obligations: Different colleagues will be affected differently by pay freezes of varying durations. Those within 5 years of retirement face vastly different circumstances than those with 15+ years remaining. Without a timeline, the equality impact cannot be properly assessed.

• “This high level of engagement reflects the importance of the issue and the complexity of individual circumstances and considerations, many of which are reflected in the Equality Impact Assessment.” The EIA is not fit for purpose, and flawed by design. It was not made explicit from the outset that the purpose of the Pension Feedback survey was to underpin an EIA. The lack of anonymity therefore meant staff self-excluded from the survey, demonstrating a lack of trust of management in handling data. How the data was to be analysed, who has access to it, how long it would be held, and where and when it would be destroyed is basic information that should be supplied to survey participants for any collection of protected characteristics that will be used to cross reference with expected personal financial impacts experienced by the TRE. Undergraduates are required to do this in dissertations as per Ethics Application procedure. Crucially, too, the EIA does not currently reflect or account for the impacts of a pay freeze/cut for anyone staying in TPS.  The feedback survey was therefore poorly executed, resulting in limited take-up, and did not ask fundamental questions (like, ‘do you agree with the TRA?’). The mechanisms for gathering information to populate any EIA must be expanded to include, for example, focus groups constituted by those with protected characteristics.  It does not refer to or account for international staff, who can already face significant additional costs (surcharge, visas etc.), and who would therefore be disproportionately affected by a pay cut. It does not refer to or account for those experiencing a physical or mental impairment that has a ‘substantial’ and ‘long-term’ negative effect which would be classified as a disability under the Equality Act.  It does not analyse the impact of the difference in total lifetime earnings and level of pension, for example, for older women who are more likely to have lower lifetime earnings/actual salary level but might have expected to make up some of the difference later in life and who stay on TPS, or for people with multiple protected characteristics, not just age. It does not recognise mid-career staff who recently switched from USS to TPS, are at the top of their grade, but not near retirement. The EIA and related documents still provide no recognition of or information for members who may require ill health retirement as a deferred member of TPS. The EIA and related documents do not acknowledge the impact (largely underpinned by age) of the impacts on and difference between those on final salary and career average. A Final salary pension is calculated by taking the ‘average salary’ and dividing it by 60 or 80 and multiplying it by the number of years someone has been in service.  The Average salary is calculated by using the better of the following calculations: The salaries for the last 10 pensionable years are increased at each salary change to current day value; the average of the best consecutive three years re-valued salaries in those 10 years; the pensionable salary received in the last 12 months of employment before the date of retirement. Most members will find that the first of these calculations usually gives a higher average salary because wage increases have not kept up with inflation.  However, in a pay freeze not only does the final 365 days salary not change but also (because of how the regulations were set up) the last 10 years salaries do not get revalued with inflation.  The revaluation of the 10 years only occurs when there is a change in the salary – so unless members get a pay increase those salaries do not get increased and members are not therefore protected from inflation and their pensions will be permanently lower because of that.  Even if they moved and started to get the increases again the cumulative effect will have been permanently lost.
• “The following elements (1-4) should be taken together as a set of changes making up a single proposal, rather than a set from which individual aspects can be accepted or implemented in isolation.” Why? No rationale for this is given. Are the ‘TRA’ or ‘TRE’ themselves negotiable? UCU have repeatedly sought clarification on what management is willing to negotiate, but responses have been vague and not made in good faith. It seems to us it has already been decided to implement the TRA/TRE. Management have not indicated either why these cost savings are necessary, nor the reason why such savings cannot be made by other means. This withholding of information is dishonest. It also does not constitute negotiation.
• “Early confirmation of a minimum pay award for 2026/27 for academic staff in USS Colleagues shared that it is difficult to make a decision about whether to change pension scheme without knowing what the level of pay increase will be from August 2026. To provide certainty and allow for more accurate modelling the University will offer a guaranteed minimum increase to the academic USS pay scale by 2% on 1 August 2026 (or the nationally determined increase if it is higher).” This is too little to be an incentive, sub-inflation, and below even what Mercer have modelled.
• “No pay award will be applied to the TPS pay scale”. This is unacceptable.
• “There are significant numbers of colleagues in TPS at the top of Grade 7 and Grade 8, who under this proposal, would receive no salary increase in August 2026. This is because they have reached the maximum point on their grade and have no more increments available. To provide a financial cushion for colleagues at Grade 7.6 and Grade 8.5 on the TPS Salary scale on 1 August 2026 to consider their options the University will pay a one-off, non-consolidated, non-pensionable payment of 1%”. At less than an additional £7.00 per week (before tax) for G7.6, this is not just unacceptable: it adds insult to injury.
• “To provide a clear pathway through this transition, we will introduce a voluntary planned retirement scheme. Under this scheme, relevant colleagues in TPS will be invited to agree a fixed retirement date between now and 31 July 2027. Colleagues who agree a retirement date during this period would receive a guaranteed minimum 2% pay increase on 1 August 2026, or the national pay award increase if it is higher, ensuring their financial position isn’t disrupted ahead of their imminent retirement.” This is too little, and ends too soon, to offer a meaningful incentive.
• “For colleagues joining Northumbria on or after 1 August 2026, their salary will be determined based on the Total Reward Envelope (TRE) applicable to their grade salary point and the pension scheme they choose to join.” The effect of this is a 10-12% immediate pay cut for new starters who stay on TPS.  This is unacceptable and will cause immediate and irredeemable reputational damage. This will repel, for example, new staff who have a long service with TPS – likely experienced, research-active, senior colleagues – if they come from another post-92, with a commensurate detriment to the university’s recruitment plans.
• The proposal says nothing about what people with no pension will be paid under the TRA.
• The proposal says nothing about those in LGPS.
• The proposal says nothing about G9 staff. The exclusion of Grade 9 from mitigation measures and the absence of an equalisation timeline create significant uncertainty and potential unfairness in the proposal. For Grade 9 colleagues in TPS, the career average structure means the financial impact is not merely deferred but permanently locked into reduced pension accrual. Every year of frozen salary represents both immediate income loss and irreversible pension reduction. It appears Grade 9 colleagues at the top of their scale are entirely excluded from the mitigations for G7.6 and G8.5 colleagues despite facing identical circumstances. Grade 9 professors currently at the top of their scale (£85,609) who remain in TPS will experience: zero pay increases from August 2026 onwards; no incremental progression; no mitigation payment unlike Grades 7.6 and 8.5; colleagues in USS receiving minimum 2% annual increases while their salaries remain frozen. This exclusion is problematic because the rationale provided for mitigating Grades 7.6 and 8.5 – that colleagues "would receive no salary increase" and need "a financial cushion to consider their options" – applies equally or more significantly to Grade 9. If anything, the financial impact is substantially greater: (Grade 7.6 one-off payment: £582.23 (1% of £58,225); Grade 8.5 one-off payment: £694.49 (1% of £69,488); Grade 9 equivalent payment: £856.09 (1% of £85,609)). This proposal also presents a disproportionate impact: Over a 7-year period (assuming 2% annual increases for USS colleagues), a Grade 9 professor in TPS would fall approximately £12,729 behind annually by year 7, with cumulative salary losses totalling £49,907. This significantly exceeds the impact on lower grades, yet receives no mitigation whatsoever. There is also a career average pension impact: Since April 2015, TPS operates on a career average basis for new accrual. Each year of frozen salary means frozen pension accrual at £85,609 ÷ 57 = £1,502 per year. Meanwhile, USS colleagues' pension accrual grows with their salary increases. Over 10 years, this frozen accrual would result in approximately £3,290 less in annual pension compared to a colleague whose salary grew at 2% annually, compounding to a lifetime pension loss exceeding £65,000 over a 20-year retirement. This is in addition to the £100,000+ in cumulative salary losses during the working years. In addition, there is the double penalty of TPS career average: Unlike final salary schemes where only the last salary matters, TPS's career average structure means every year of frozen salary permanently reduces pension accrual. Colleagues who remain in TPS face: immediate salary loss (no pay increases while USS colleagues receive 2% annually); permanent pension reduction (each frozen year accrues less pension than it should); compounding lifetime impact (reduced pension paid over 20-30 years of retirement). This creates a fundamentally different financial reality than the pre-2015 final salary scheme, yet the proposal fails to acknowledge this structural difference.