Addendum to Counter-Proposals

See UCU's addendum to the Counter-Proposals to management's plans, reflecting their recent disclosures.

Total Reward Approach for Academic Staff

UCU Counter-Proposal: Addendum

Evidence from the Academic Staff Briefing, 11 February 2026

February 2026

"When we know how many colleagues have moved to USS, i.e. how many colleagues remain in Teachers’ Pensions, we’re going to re-enter negotiations with UCU about whether it’s affordable"

— Jane Embley, Academic Staff Briefing, 11 February 2026

Executive Summary

  • No formal response: The University has provided no written response to UCU’s counter-proposal of 29 January 2026. Neither the BRIDGE nor USS-SS framework has been acknowledged, critiqued, or engaged with in any form.
  • 3% conversion rate: After three months of intensive engagement, Mercer advisory sessions, and two rounds of sweetened incentives, just 40 out of 1,200 TPS members have committed to move to USS. The strategy is failing on its own terms.
  • 17% intention-to-action ratio: Of the ~117 Mercer session attendees who stated they intended to switch, only ~20 have actually done so. The pipeline from advisory sessions to committed transitions is converting at one in six.
  • £326,140 saved against an £11 million target: The TRA has captured 3% of the headline saving. Over 97% of the stated cost differential remains unrealised, and under any realistic projection will remain so.
  • UCU’s counter-proposal was more generous than reality: All comparative modelling in the counter-proposal assumed TRA conversion rates of 25–30%. The actual rate is an order of magnitude lower, meaning the counter-proposal’s figures understated the gap between the TRA and UCU’s alternatives.
  • Both BRIDGE and USS-SS outperform the TRA: Under realistic conversion assumptions, UCU’s two alternative frameworks deliver 10-year savings of £30–53 million, compared to £4–6 million under the TRA. The counter-proposal remains the credible route to addressing the pension cost differential.
  • Industrial action is ongoing and escalating: UCU members have completed five days of strike action and are currently engaged in ASOS. A further five days of industrial action are planned for March. The mandate for action extends to July 2026. This disruption can be brought to an end immediately if the University withdraws the threat of a pay freeze for TPS members and its withdrawal from national collective bargaining.

All figures cited in this addendum are drawn from management’s own most recent disclosures, as presented by Professor Tom Lawson (Executive Vice-Chancellor and Provost) and Jane Embley (Director of HR) at the Academic Staff Briefing on 11 February 2026. UCU has not relied on estimates or projections where management data is available.

Section 1: Failure to Engage with the Counter-Proposal

On 29 January 2026, UCU Northumbria submitted a detailed counter-proposal to the University, setting out two alternative frameworks—BRIDGE and USS-SS—for achieving sustainable pension cost reduction. The counter-proposal was founded on extensive financial modelling, sensitivity analysis across multiple conversion rate scenarios, and the principle of Sharing the Savings, Sharing the Risks—a principle drawn directly from the University’s own stated intention to “share some of the cost saving” with staff.

As of the date of this addendum, the University has provided no formal response to the counter-proposal. No written acknowledgement. No engagement with the financial modelling. No critique of the assumptions. No counter-offer. At the All-Staff Briefing on 4 February 2026, the Vice-Chancellor made no reference to the counter-proposal whatsoever. At the Academic Staff Briefing on 11 February 2026—the transcript of which forms the basis of this addendum—neither the Executive Vice-Chancellor nor the Director of HR mentioned the counter-proposal, its frameworks, or its analysis.

Instead, management presented what it described as a “final offer,” comprising a package of four elements to be “accepted or rejected as a package.” This is the language of ultimatum, not negotiation. A genuine negotiating partner does not receive a detailed counter-proposal and respond with a take-it-or-leave-it package that shows no trace of engagement with the alternative analysis.

The Disappearance of “Sharing the Savings”

UCU notes a further troubling development. In earlier communications, the University explicitly stated its intention to “share some of the cost saving” with staff. This language was significant: UCU’s counter-proposal adopted it as a foundational principle and built both the BRIDGE and USS-SS frameworks around it. The counter-proposal’s introduction states:

"The University has stated its intention to ‘share some of the cost saving’ with staff. UCU welcomes this principle. However, the mechanism proposed—a pay freeze for TPS members—does not share savings; it transfers risk."

In the communications that followed the submission of UCU’s counter-proposal, this language has quietly disappeared. The phrase “share some of the cost saving” has been replaced by vague references to “competitive pay” and “competitive salaries.” The University has not explained this change. UCU can only observe that the one element of management’s own framing that UCU adopted and built upon was silently withdrawn. This does not suggest an institution acting in good faith. It suggests an institution that would rather abandon its own language than engage with a union that took it seriously.

Section 2: Analysis of Conversion Rate Evidence

The Headline Figure: 40 out of 1,200

At the Academic Staff Briefing on 11 February 2026, Jane Embley confirmed that 40 colleagues have formally requested to move from TPS to USS. The University first communicated the Total Reward Approach to staff in November 2025. The deadline for the Transition Support Scheme is 30 April 2026. At the time of the briefing, the process was therefore approximately 60% through its timeline.

Against the total TPS-eligible population of approximately 1,200 academic staff, 40 committed transitions represents a conversion rate of 3.3%.

Jane Embley herself acknowledged the importance of measuring outcomes. She stated that the University needs to see “the amount of movement” and assess “the success of this initial strategy for people to move to USS” before it can take a view on TPS pay. UCU poses the question directly: is a 3.3% conversion rate, after three months of intensive engagement, the success that was anticipated? If not, who will own this failure? And who will pay for it?

Mercer Exit Poll Data

Management also disclosed indicative data from Mercer pension advisory sessions. Over 750 staff have booked a session, with 450+ having attended. Exit polling from those sessions shows the following:

Stated Intention on Leaving Session

Proportion

Approx. Number

Intend to move to USS

26%

~117

Unsure

50%

~225

Intend to stay in TPS

~24%

~108

 Note: Management reported these figures as “26%,” “half,” and “about 25%”—totalling 101%. UCU has adjusted the “stay” figure to 24% to correct the rounding error.

These figures derive from the most engaged cohort—those who proactively booked and attended an advisory session. The approximately 450 TPS members who have not booked any session are, by revealed preference, less motivated to consider transition. There is no basis to assume they will convert at rates comparable to, let alone higher than, the attendee group.

The Intention-to-Action Ratio

The most significant figure disclosed at the briefing is one that management did not draw attention to. Jane Embley confirmed that of the 40 committed switchers, approximately half had attended a Mercer session. The other half decided independently.

This means that of the approximately 117 attendees who told Mercer they intended to move to USS, only around 20 have actually committed. The intention-to-action ratio from Mercer sessions is therefore approximately 17%. Barely one in six people who state an intention to switch after receiving professional pension advice actually follow through.

The remaining 20 committed switchers appear to be “self-starters” who were already convinced and did not require a Mercer session. This group is, by its nature, largely self-exhausting; the most decisive individuals have already acted.

Projected Final Conversion Rates

Based on the evidence now available, UCU projects the following scenarios for the final conversion rate by the 30 April 2026 deadline:

Scenario

Conv. Rate

Switchers

Annual Saving

Basis

Linear trend

~6%

~70

£0.57m

Current pace extrapolated to deadline

Exit poll adjusted

~4%

~50

£0.41m

17% follow-through applied to all intenders + trickle

Generous best case

~8%

~100

£0.82m

50% follow-through (3× current) + 10% of unsures

UCU considers the 6–8% range to be the most realistic outcome. Even the “generous best case” requires tripling the observed intention-to-action ratio—an outcome for which there is no evidence and no obvious catalyst.

What Would Change This?

In assessing whether higher conversion is plausible, UCU has considered what tools management has yet to deploy. The answer is: very few. Since November 2025, the University has:

  • Engaged Mercer to provide individual advisory sessions (750+ booked, 450+ attended)
  • Increased the guaranteed USS pay uplift from 2% to 3%
  • Increased the Transition Support Scheme cap from its original level to £12,000
  • Extended the TSS deadline to 30 April
  • Introduced split payment flexibility (lump sum and USS pension contribution)
  • Relaxed the payback clause (100% in year one, 50% in year two)
  • Introduced a voluntary severance scheme offering up to 12 months’ pay

Every available incentive has been deployed. The offer has been sweetened twice. And the result is 40 committed switchers—33 of every 1,000 TPS members. The 50% of Mercer attendees who remain “unsure” have heard the full pitch, received professional advice, and seen the enhanced package. They are not unsure because they lack information. They are unsure because the deal is not good enough, or because—as Mercer’s own advice confirms—remaining in TPS is the rational choice.

The low uptake is itself the most significant feedback management has received. It is louder and more definitive than any survey response.

Section 3: The Cost of Failure

The University has repeatedly cited the figure of £11 million per year as the cost differential between TPS and USS pension schemes. This figure was used to justify the entire Total Reward Approach. UCU now invites management to consider the actual savings generated by its strategy to date.

At an average academic salary of £57,500 and an employer contribution differential of 14.18 percentage points, each transition generates an annual employer saving of £8,153.50. For the 40 staff who have committed to move:

Metric

Value

Headline annual target (100% conversion)

£11,000,000

Annual saving from 40 switchers

£326,140

Percentage of target achieved

3.0%

Annual saving left unrealised

£10,673,860

 

The University has spent three months conducting an intensive campaign of briefings, communications, Mercer advisory sessions, and increasingly sweetened incentives. It has engaged external pension consultants, committed significant HR and senior management time, and provoked a trade dispute that has already resulted in five days of strike action, ongoing action short of a strike, and a further five days of industrial action planned for March—with a mandate extending to July 2026. The annual saving generated by this effort—£326,140—is equivalent to the salary cost of approximately four academic staff.

UCU does not have visibility of the full costs incurred in pursuing this strategy, including the Mercer contract, HR staff time, management briefings, legal advice, contingency planning, and the direct and indirect costs of the industrial action already taken—including disruption to teaching, assessment, and student experience. It is entirely possible that the costs of the exercise exceed the savings it has generated.

Even under the generous best-case scenario (8% conversion, ~100 switchers), annual savings would reach approximately £815,000—just 7.4% of the £11 million headline. Under any realistic projection, the TRA will leave more than 90% of the stated saving unrealised.

 

Section 4: The Counter-Proposal Remains the Credible Alternative

UCU’s counter-proposal of 29 January 2026 presented two alternative frameworks, both founded on the principle of Sharing the Savings, Sharing the Risks:

  • BRIDGE (Balanced Retention and Institutional Development through Genuine Engagement)—offering targeted, one-off Transition Support Scheme payments of 40–50% of salary, phased over five years with no clawback, designed to maximise financial savings through positive incentivisation
  • USS-SS (USS Salary Supplement)—offering an ongoing monthly salary supplement to all staff who choose USS, preserving the single salary scale in perpetuity while creating a permanent, transparent incentive framework

UCU notes that all the comparative financial modelling in the counter-proposal was conducted on the basis of assumed TRA conversion rates of 25–30%—rates that we stated at the time were generous to management’s position, given Mercer’s advice that remaining in TPS is the rational choice. The real-world evidence now shows that 25–30% was not merely generous; it was wildly optimistic. The actual conversion rate is an order of magnitude lower.

This means that every scenario comparison in the counter-proposal understated the gap between the TRA and UCU’s alternatives. We modelled the TRA at its most favourable; reality has been far less kind. That UCU chose to negotiate on assumptions that flattered management’s position was a deliberate act of good faith. That this good faith was not reciprocated—that the counter-proposal received no formal response whatsoever—is a matter of record.

Both BRIDGE and USS-SS were designed to achieve higher voluntary conversion through positive incentivisation rather than coercion. The evidence from 11 February confirms the central premise of our analysis: that coercive mechanisms do not generate mass voluntary migration. Staff are not moving because the deal is not attractive enough and because their own pension advisors have told them it is not in their interest to do so. No amount of incremental sweetening within the TRA framework will change this fundamental dynamic.

The Arithmetic Is Now Unanswerable

If the £11 million annual differential is the problem the University seeks to address, then the TRA has failed to address it. At 3.3% conversion, the strategy captures £326,000 of an £11 million gap. Even under generous projections, it will capture less than £1 million.

Under our counter-proposal, at a BRIDGE conversion rate of 50%—a rate that positive incentivisation makes achievable—the 10-year net saving was modelled at approximately £37.75 million. At 70%, it rises to £52.85 million. Under USS-SS at 70% conversion, the projected 10-year saving was approximately £38 million. All of these figures dwarf what the TRA is on course to deliver.

 

 

TRA (Actual)

BRIDGE

USS-SS

Realistic conversion rate

6–8%

50–70%

50–70%

Annual employer saving

£0.5–0.8m

£3.3–4.6m

£2.9–4.1m

10-year net saving

£4–6m

£37–53m

£30–38m

Pay freeze required

Indefinite

None

None

National bargaining

Suspended

Maintained

Maintained

Single salary scale

Abolished

Maintained

Preserved permanently

Industrial relations risk

Severe

Low

Low

 

Section 5: Conclusion and Invitation to Negotiate

The evidence presented at the 11 February 2026 briefing confirms what UCU has argued throughout this process: the Total Reward Approach is not delivering the voluntary migration it requires, and the coercive mechanisms embedded within it are not an adequate substitute for genuine incentivisation. A 3.3% committed conversion rate after three months of intensive effort is not a slow start. It is a structural failure of the strategy.

UCU members have already taken five days of strike action and are currently engaged in action short of a strike. A further five days of industrial action are planned for March, and the mandate for action extends to July 2026. All of this can be brought to an end immediately. UCU is not seeking industrial action for its own sake. If the University removes the threat of a pay freeze for TPS members and reverses its withdrawal from national collective bargaining, the basis for the dispute is resolved and industrial action can cease. The choice is management’s.

UCU reiterates its call for the University to:

  1. Withdraw the Total Reward Approach in its current form
  2. Provide a formal, written response to the UCU counter-proposal of 29 January 2026
  3. Enter into genuine negotiations on the basis of either the BRIDGE or USS-SS framework, or a combination thereof
  4. Commit to the principle of Sharing the Savings, Sharing the Risks—not merely in rhetoric, but in the design of any transition mechanism

The University has stated that it wants to address a structural cost problem. UCU agrees that this is a legitimate objective. But the TRA is not achieving it. Our counter-proposal can. It is time to sit down, engage properly, and negotiate.

UCU remains available for immediate discussions.

UCU Northumbria Branch

February 2026